An interim inquiry report into the fire at the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences that killed 14 newborns has said the precise source of ignition remains technically unresolved, but cleared frontline clinical staff of abandoning the infants, stating that CCTV evidence showed immediate rescue attempts were made.
The Minister of Information and Broadcasting issued an interim report, prepared by the four-member committee, constituted to probe the deadly fire at Pims gynaecology ward.
The Committee, in its report, said the fire became visibly apparent at approximately 6:38am on August 26 and developed with extraordinary rapidity, rendering the nursery environment substantially smoke-engulfed within approximately two minutes.
“The objective CCTV evidence does not support a generalised finding that frontline clinical staff abandoned the newborns,” the report stated.
The precise ignition source, however, remains technically unresolved. The committee said an internal electrical or equipment-related origin remained plausible but available evidence did not conclusively establish whether an incubator, warmer, air conditioner, plug, socket, wiring or another component initiated the fire.
Serious institutional failures
At the institutional level, the committee said evidence already disclosed prima facie serious deficiencies requiring accountability and immediate correction, particularly concerning fire and life-safety preparedness, emergency exits and access, emergency notification, evacuation planning, firefighting arrangements, security coordination and the translation of existing responsibilities into operational readiness.
The committee noted that these concerns acquired greater significance because Pims had experienced another fire only seven weeks earlier, and deficiencies involving substantially similar institutional safeguards had already been formally identified at that time.
Clinical failures
The committee found that the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit was supervised by fewer staff than required by the duty roster at the time of the fire. It said ensuring the presence of all doctors and allied staff at their place of duty was the responsibility of the head of the unit, Professor Dr Sadia Riaz.
The committee recommended the immediate suspension of Professor Dr Sadia Riaz, Head of Department Neonatology at Children Hospital Pims, and Dr Nagham, Senior Registrar of the Neonatology Department, for failing to ensure the presence of qualified healthcare professionals and for absenting themselves from duty at the material time.
Administrative failures
The committee found that following the fire at the Pims Nursing Hostel in July 2026, the hospital administration failed to perform its duty and responsibility with due diligence.
It did not take necessary steps that would have included fire safety drills, ensuring the integrity of firefighting equipment, and detailed standard operating procedures and incident handling regimes.
The committee recommended the immediate suspension of Professor Dr Imran Sikandar, Executive Director Pims; Dr Mutahir Shah, Joint Executive Director MCH; Ch. Waris Ali Raza, Joint Executive Director Non-Medical Pims; and Dr Nosheela Amjad, Director MCH — all to be proceeded against under the E&D Rules 2020.
External agencies
The committee also found that the Capital Emergency Service, the foremost organisation responsible for fire safety in Islamabad including Pims, failed to take cognisance of systemic failures at Pims following the July 2026 fire incident and did not press for drills, protocols or SOPs.
It recommended the immediate suspension of Dr Abdul Rehman, Director General CES CDA Islamabad, and Muhammad Usman, Assistant Director Security, for absence from duty without leave and dereliction of duty.
The committee further recommended that Belfort Security be proceeded against under relevant laws by its employer Pims for failing to fulfil its contractual obligations.
Criminal investigation
The committee said circumstances involving mandatory fire exits allegedly being locked or obstructed, possible culpable failure to act upon previously identified life-safety deficiencies, and any established culpable delay in summoning external emergency services should be referred for criminal investigation where verification disclosed the ingredients of a cognizable offence, while final criminal culpability should remain for the competent investigating and judicial authorities.
The committee said the emerging institutional lesson was more consequential than identifying a single defective appliance or individual responder, noting that the precise first spark remained unresolved but that accountability did not begin and end with the spark.
It said the record required three separate responses — discipline where an assigned public duty was prima facie neglected, contractual action where outsourced obligations were breached, and criminal investigation where a culpable omission affecting life safety may have materially contributed to the deaths.
